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MEDICAL CARE THROUGH THE RETROSCOPE:
TORT REFORM
FROM THE DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE
James A. Comodeca, J.D.a
Margaret M. Maggio, R.N./C.N.M., J.D.b
Philip J. Truax, J.D.c
Joshua M. Bilz, J.D.d
I.

INTRODUCTION

Speaking to the recent rash of airline bankruptcies, a concerned
friend asserted that when he flies, he wants the plane to be in the control of a
happy, relaxed, focused pilot. Similarly, when he undergoes surgery, he
wants the knife to be in the hands of a surgeon whose only concern is the
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procedure at hand. It is not too broad of a generalization to assert that even
the most calloused of Plaintiffs’ attorneys would prefer not to be operated
on by a physician who has just completed a deposition. Rather, all
Americans want our health care providers focused on what they do best—
providing care to us so that we may live.
We represent health care professionals and institutions comprised of
the same. Those professionals are typically medical physicians—men and
women who spent their undergraduate years immersed in rigorous curricula
watching from the library as their classmates partied on; spent months
preparing for and anxiously sitting for the MCAT; devoted the years in their
20's to tackling the understanding of high-level science involving the
complex mechanism known as the human body while foregoing sleep and a
social life to attend to clinical rotations; followed by watching from the
hospital as their friends embarked on the commencement of family life and
careers while the doctors instead embarked on the endurance test known as
residency. Through their sacrifice and dedication these men and women
provide a service, which cannot be matched—they keep us healthy and they
give us a gift more precious than any other possession—our very lives.
These men and women who heal us when we are injured are truly our
golden geese.
Yet, these men and women, receive as their just due the thanks of
literally being called killers, injurers, deprivers of support, inflictors of
cerebral palsy, disability, mental distress, loss of capacity to enjoy life, etc.,
etc., etc. . . . as Plaintiffs simply pay a court fee and, in most states, pretty
much say whatever they want about the doctor with impunity. Without a
thought of how such allegations might affect the psyche of another human
being who has provided service to them, much less the physicians’ families,
who often sacrifice their own time and relationships with their loved ones so
that the doctor can care for others, some Plaintiffs hurl accusations at
physicians that are no different than someone accusing another of driving
down the highway with the car stereo blaring, applying make-up, drinking a
cup of coffee and cavalierly hitting a pedestrian with their automobile—i.e.,
injury and death by way of negligence. “Doctor, you killed my child . . .
injured my father . . . made me a quadriplegic.” And Plaintiffs’ attorneys
wonder why doctors cannot simply get thick skinned and considered
lawsuits simply the cost of doing business?
Civil actions based on allegations of medical malpractice in the
United States are currently treated as cases of simple negligence. That is, in
theory, civil liability attaches when a health care provider and/or institution
fails to conform behavior to a certain standard of conduct for which they
have a legal duty, combined with a reasonably close causal connection
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between such conduct and a resulting injury which consists of actual loss or
damage resulting to the interests of another.1 In practice, however, judging
a doctor's actions under a negligence standard isn’t always so neat and tidy,
for triers of fact have one critical fact at their disposal that defendant health
care providers significantly lack when making treatment decisions—the
outcome. In fact, a significant predictor of success in the American tort
system in medical malpractice cases is the degree of injury, not the existence
of malpractice.2
In our combined experience, we have had the pleasure of both
defending and befriending hundreds of physicians and other health care
providers and administrators, all of whom, without exception, felt that a
patient truly injured by a medical mistake should be compensated. Their
frustration is not with compensation of the truly injured, it is rather dismay
with a system that is outcome driven3—a system where a health care
provider’s work is judged under the retroscope with the benefit of knowing
all of the facts which the health care provider did not have at their disposal
at the time of care. While our clients are concerned and financially
squeezed by increasing medical malpractice premiums, they are equally as
concerned with questions of fundamental fairness.
Recently, a physician analogized medical diagnosis and treatment to
traveling through fog where the entire picture is not clear, but guiding
decisions must be made. When medical malpractice suits are filed, those
medical decisions are then evaluated as if made in the full sunlight with the
outcome as the backdrop for the standard of care. While at least one antitort reform group routinely refers to doctors as “cavalier,”4 in our
experience, we have not met one doctor who did not genuinely care about
his patient nor have we met a doctor who wished a poor outcome on his
patient.
This article examines the slow, painful demise of the health care
provider golden goose by a patient compensation system which fails to meet
its stated goal by instead decreasing access to medical care, driving up the
costs of medical care and most importantly, damaging the enthusiasm, the
drive and the dedication of the people upon whom we depend for our very
lives. As defense attorneys, we support the public policy goals of

_______________________________________________________
1

W.P. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton On Torts §30 (5th ed., 1984).
David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 New Eng. J. Med. 283, 286 (Jan. 15, 2004) (citing
J.S. Kakalik & N.M. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation (RAND 1986)).
3
A significant predictive factor of success in a medical malpractice lawsuit is degree of injury—not
incidence of malpractice. Id. (citing P.C. Weiler, et al., A Measure of Malpractice: MedicalIinjury,
Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation (Harv. U. Press 1993)).
4
Public Citizen, Medical Malpractice Briefing Book: Challenging the Misleading Claims of the Doctor's
Lobby, v (Aug. 2004) (available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/MedMalBriefingBook08-09-04.pdf (accessed Jan. 11, 2006)).
2
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accessible, quality care and the provision of a fair and accurate system of
patient compensation. To that end, the changes in the system put into place
by means of current tort reform legislation, specifically the damages caps
system, will be examined. Although other innovative systems for dealing
with medical malpractice claims have been proposed,5 and one has been
introduced in Congress in 2005,6 we will address and we support the cap
system as being, at present, the most feasible means of the stabilization of
medical malpractice premiums and the medical provision system as well as
the deterrence of frivolous lawsuits. We will then examine proposed federal
legislation as a means of providing a system that truly provides for fair and
honest compensation of truly injured patients while fairly treating doctors to
allow them to do what they do best—care for patients.
II.

THE PROBLEM: THE PATIENT COMPENSATION
SYSTEM IN AMERICA IS FLAWED

Both physicians and patients are victims of a seriously flawed
malpractice system in the United States.7 In particular, the process of airing
and resolving claims through litigation is destructive for all concerned,
while the “dynamics of malpractice insurance drive premiums into crisis
cycles with pernicious consequences.”8 While both the Plaintiffs’ and
Defense bars agree that the goals of a compensation system are the same, an
overview of the current tort system shows that while pursuing such claims
under such a system might have an internal logic, in practice, the joint social
goals of promoting safer medicine and compensating wrongfully-injured
patients are not being achieved.9 Instead, the system drives our nation’s
physicians out of private practice, increases the costs of health care, and
encourages “the ordering of tests and procedures that are of marginal or no
medical benefit, primarily for the purpose of reducing medicolegal risk.”10
As a former president of the American Medical Association succinctly
capsulated the problem, “[a]n over-litigious system is anathema to building
a strong and effective national patient safety program.”11

_______________________________________________________
5

Other proposed medical malpractice compensation schemes include the creation of health care courts,
non-fault workers compensation-type systems, enterprise liability for hospitals and early-offer
negotiation. See Studdert et al., supra n. 2, at 289.
6
The Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, introduced in the United States Senate in June 2005, would
create a pilot program in a limited number of selected states to establish special health care courts for
medical malpractice claim determination. Sen. 1337, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005). This proposed
bipartisan legislation is sponsored by groups such as the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists and is currently in Committee.
7
Medical News Today, Effect of Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Suits, Health Affairs, JAMA
Studies Examine, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=25517 (June 2, 2005).
8
Id.
9
Studdert et al., supra n. 2, at 283-284.
10
Id. at 286.
11
Donald J. Palmisano, Statement of the AMA to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee
on Health Re: Assessing the Need to Enact Medical Liability Reform,
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The Current Malpractice System Does Not Do Its Job

The overriding goal of all negligence law applies to medical
malpractice law as well: to provide incentives for physicians to take
appropriate precautions against medical injury and to adequately
compensate those patients injured by medical care.12 However, studies
reveal that the malpractice system is a profoundly inaccurate mechanism for
distributing compensation to patients.13 Many refer to the current medical
malpractice system as “the ‘lawsuit lottery,’ which provides windfalls for
some patients, but no compensation for the vast majority of patients injured
by medical care.”14 Further, evidence supporting the notion that the system
in any way deters medical negligence is very limited.15
A review of statistics from around the country reveal a flawed and
inefficient system for compensating injured patients. Of all malpractice
cases filed against health care providers, nearly seventy-five percent are
closed without any payment to the patient.16 Furthermore, less than thirty
percent of all money that doctors pay in liability insurance fees actually goes
to patients.17 Rather than compensating patients, attorneys’ fees account for
forty percent or more of multi-million dollar payouts, according to the
National Center for Policy Analysis.18 Viewed from another angle,
approximately sixty cents of every dollar expended on the medical
malpractice system goes to pay overhead, i.e., administrative costs
comprised predominantly of legal fees.19 This figure is fully twice the
overhead rate for an average workers’ compensation scheme.20
Moreover, a Harvard research team concluded that, in New York,
the alarming incompetence of the liability system is “a searing indictment of

http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/print/12992.html (Feb. 27, 2003)
[hereinafter Energy & Commerce Statement].
12
See Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, How liability law affects medical productivity, 21 J.
Health Econ. 931 (2002).
13
Studdert et al., supra n. 2, at 285.
14
Id. at 283.
15
See id. at 286 (citing Mello & Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for
Malpractice Reforms, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1595 (2002)).
16
Am. Med. Assn., Medical Liability Reform—NOW!, A compendium of facts supporting medical
liability reform and debunking arguments against reform.,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/378/
mlrnowoct192005.pdf (updated Oct. 19, 2005) (accessed Jan. 11, 2006) [hereinafter The Facts].
17
Id.; see also Am. Med. Assn., America's Medical Liability Crisis: We All Pay for the Broken System
(Feb. 2005) available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/399/mlr_fastfacts.pdf (accessed
Dec. 23, 2005) (citing Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, U.S. Tort Costs: 2003 Update) [hereinafter America’s
Liability Crisis].
18
Natl. Ctr. for Policy Analysis, Lawsuits Hike Healthcare Costs, http://www.ncpa.org/iss/leg/2002/
pd073102f.html (July 31, 2002).
19
Studdert et al., supra n. 2, at 286 (citing J.S. Kakalik & N.M. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in
Tort Litigation, (RAND 1986)).
20
Id.
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the performance of the malpractice system.”21 Their study revealed that, in
the state of New York, only seventeen percent, or approximately one out of
six, of medical malpractice civil actions actually filed, appeared to actually
involve a negligent injury.22 Thus, despite Plaintiffs’ attorneys contention
that frivolous lawsuits are rare, incredibly, five out of six claimants in the
Harvard study sought compensation for injuries that were not the result of
medical negligence.23 Speaking to this disparity, one group of medical
authors suggested “the analogy of a traffic cop who regularly gives out more
tickets to drivers who go through green lights than to those who run red
lights.”24
The Harvard conclusions were virtually identical to a study
conducted in Utah and Colorado in the late 1990’s, leading to the conclusion
that the inconsistency observed between injury and litigation were neither
regionally nor temporally isolated.25 Then, a ten-year follow-up survey of
the Harvard data from New York showed that the key predictor of payment
was the plaintiff’s degree of disability, not the presence of negligence.26 Put
another way, “the primary determinant of whether an injury will receive
compensation is the extent of the injury, not the extent of fault.”27 Who
would choose to be part of a profession that is the target of such a system?
In addition to failing to provide redress for negligently injured
patients, the malpractice liability system fails to provide incentives for
optimal medical care or to deter substandard care. While trial attorneys
passionately, but incorrectly, assert that the threat of litigation assures that
doctors will practice more safely, in reality “the punitive, individualistic,
adversarial approach of tort law is antithetical to the nonpunitive, systemsoriented, cooperative strategies promoted by the leaders of the patient-safety
movement.”28 A few studies have attempted to model the relationships
between malpractice claims experience and subsequent rates of adverse
events, negligence rates, or quality-of-care indicators.29 When the data is
considered as a whole, the evidence that the system deters medical
negligence can be characterized as limited at best.30 In fact, rather than
providing incentives or deterring negligent behavior, threats of malpractice
liability have instead caused more stress, pressure, and anxiety, all the while

_______________________________________________________
21

Id. at 285 (citing the Harv. Med. Prac. Study, analyzing 30,000 hospital discharges and 3,500
malpractice claims in the mid-1980s).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. (citing P.C. Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and
Patient Compensation (Harv. U. Press, 1993)).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Kessler & McClellan, supra n. 12, at 931 (emphasis added).
28
Studdert et al., supra n. 2, at 287.
29
Id. at 286.
30
Id.
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distracting clinical decision making.31
B.

The Current System Encourages the Expensive and
Deleterious Practice of Defensive Medicine

If physicians perceive that medical malpractice system assessments
are not consistent with the standard of care and with their own individual
medical practices, they may try to satisfy all possible standards by practicing
defensive medicine, whether consciously or unconsciously.32 Defensive
medicine most often occurs when physicians order tests or procedures not
based on their clinical judgment but rather to protect or cover themselves
from potential litigation.33 Physicians may also refer patients to emergency
departments, safety net hospitals, and academic health centers to avoid
lawsuits.34 A nationwide survey by the American Medical Association,
revealed that fully seventy-nine percent of physicians reported that the “fear
of being sued” caused them to order more tests because of concerns of
potential medical liability lawsuits.35
But the practice of defensive medicine does not simply include the
ordering of more tests or taking additional precautions in order to avoid
liability. Defensive medicine also involves declining to supply care that has
expected medical benefit in order to avoid malpractice, thereby reducing
access to care (i.e. negative defensive medicine).36 More specifically, some
physicians respond to the threat of malpractice litigation by declining to take
calls in the emergency room and by declining elective referrals from
emergency departments and safety net clinics.37 Fully forty-two percent of
the physicians surveyed by the Harvard School of Public Health said that
liability concerns have forced them to restrict some practices since 2000,
including eliminating procedures and avoiding patients with complex
medical problems or those who appeared litigious.38

_______________________________________________________
31

Infra. § II(D)(1).
Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance and Damage Caps: Getting Beyond Band
Aids to Substantive Systems Treatment to Improve Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 30 Am. J.L. & Med.
501, 530 (2004).
33
Joseph L. Murphy, A Physicians’ Perspective on the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 13 Ann. Health L.
623, 626 (2004).
34
Donald J. Palmisano, Heath Care in Crisis: The Need for Medical Liability Reform, 5 Yale J. Health
Policy L. & Ethics 371, 375 (Winter 2005).
35
The Facts, supra n. 16 (citing Fear of Litigation Study; The Impact on Medicine, Common Good, (Apr.
11, 2002)).
36
Daniel P. Kessler, William M. Sage, & David J. Becker, The Impact of Malpractice Reforms on the
Supply of Physician Services, J. Am. Med. Assn. vol. 293, no. 21 at 2618 (2005).
37
Palmisano, supra n. 34, at 375; see also BNA, Maintaining Adequate On-Call Coverage Increasingly
Challenging Task for Hospitals, Health L. Rptr., Vol. 14, No. 37 at 1231 (Sept. 22, 2005), available at
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/hlr.nsf/is/a0b1k0d0t9, (accessed Sept. 22, 2005) (BNA password required)
(citing malpractice liability and increases in malpractice premiums as some of several reasons for the
problem).
38
Murphy, supra n. 33, at 626.
32

Published by eCommons, 2005

214

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

In a survey of Pennsylvania physicians in “high-risk” specialties
such as Emergency Medicine, General Surgery, Orthopedic Surgery,
Neurosurgery, Obstetrics/Gynecology and Radiology, researchers from the
Harvard School of Public Health found a staggering ninety-three percent
reported that they deviate from “sound medical practice” to lower the risk of
lawsuits.39
Unfortunately for doctors, it is ironic that defensive medicine may
in fact be counterproductive and actually might increase malpractice risk.40
Physicians who order tests or perform diagnostic procedures with low
predictive values or provide aggressive treatment for low-risk conditions
increase the likelihood that such practices will become the legal standard of
care.41
Furthermore, physicians who provide unnecessary invasive
procedures and surgery may, in fact, violate the standard of care, actually
causing more malpractice, which could be the basis for litigation.42 Doctors
find themselves in the position of being damned if you do, damned if you
don’t.
However, in the current litigious environment, where doctors in
some areas are literally targets for Plaintiffs’ attorneys whose incomes are
based primarily on medical malpractice lawsuits, some physicians appear to
practice defensive medicine as a reflex response, even though there is no
evidence that they serve their own purposes but where there is substantial
possibility that they are increasing their malpractice liability.43 The threat of
being personally attacked by such a lawsuit as well as the perceived burden
of crushing malpractice premiums may overwhelm even objective evidence
of potential effects of defensive actions on malpractice exposure for such
physicians.44
Not only does defensive medicine waste physicians’ time and
efforts, as well as possibly expose both patients to risk of harm and
physicians to greater risk of liability, the practice of defensive medicine is
incredibly costly. The precise costs of practicing defensive medicine are
difficult to quantify, but the United States Department of Health and Human
Services estimates that defensive medicine practices cost anywhere from

_______________________________________________________
39

David M. Studdert, et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile
Malpractice Environment, J. Am. Med. Assn., Vol. 293, No. 21 at 2617 (2005) (One caveat of the
authors is that these physicians have a strong vested interest and they suggest that “self-reports of
defensive medicine may be biased toward giving a socially desirable response or achieving political
goals.”) [hereinafter Defensive Medicine].
40
Peter P. Budetti, Tort Reform and the Patient Safety Movement: Seeking Common Ground, J. Am.
Med. Assn., Vol. 293, No. 21 at 2660 (2005).
41
See Defensive Medicine, supra n. 39, at 2616 (describing various medical practices now characterized
as defensive).
42
Budetti, supra n. 40, at 2660-2661.
43
Id. at 2661.
44
Id.; see also Studdert et al., supra n. 2, at 287.
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$70 billion to $126 billion per year.45 Another study conducted by
economic researchers at Stanford estimated that $84 billion to $151 billion
could be saved on defensive medicine each year.46 It is axiomatic that when
health care costs are driven up, health insurance becomes more expensive
and harder to obtain. It is no wonder that there are so many uninsured
Americans.
C.

The Current System Drives Up the Costs of Health Care

The U.S. tort liability system is the most expensive in the world,
with annual direct costs alone totaling nearly $180 billion dollars, or $650
for every man, woman and child who is a citizen of the United States.47 Of
those costs, only twenty percent of the dollars spent actually go to claimants
for economic damages.48
Thus it comes as no surprise that, in reporting the results of a recent
study, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Service concluded that
medical malpractice lawsuits are driving up the cost of health care in
America.49 Overall litigation costs, which include the effects of defensive
medicine, liability premiums, risk management, outsized awards, and legal
costs,50 add $50 billion to $110 billion to the costs of private health care
each year and another $30 billion to $60 billion to federal government
payments for Medicare, Medicaid and other programs.51
Furthermore, medical malpractice payouts to Plaintiffs comprise a
significant portion of those medical malpractice litigation costs. For
example, approximately $1 billion in medical malpractice compensation was
paid out in the two states of New York and Pennsylvania alone in 2000.52
The total costs of medical malpractice litigation, excluding defensive
medicine estimates and insurance premiums, now exceeds $26 billion
annually and continues to grow.53
In looking for the source of such astronomical costs, one need not

_______________________________________________________
45
The Facts, supra n. 16, at 6 (citing U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., Addressing the New Health
Care Crisis,, (March 2003)).
46
America's Liability Crisis, supra n. 17, at 1 (“[c]alculation[s] based on Kessler & McClellan, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 1996; 2003 CMS data on national health expenditures”).
47
White H. Council Econ. Advisors, Who Pays for Tort Liability Claims? (Apr., 2002) (available at
http://www.policyalmanac.org/economic/archive/torts.shtml (accessed Jan. 4, 2006)).
48
Id.
49
Natl. Ctr. for Policy Analysis, supra n. 18.
50
The Facts, supra n. 16, at 8 (citing Price Waterhouse Cooper’s study, Apr. 2002).
51
Natl. Ctr. for Policy Analysis, supra n. 18.
52
Richard E. Anderson, Effective Legal Reform and the Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 5 Yale J. Health
Policy, L. & Ethics 341, 347 (2005); see also Natl. Underwriter, Study: Tort Costs Still Edging Up,
Albeit More Slowly
http://www.nationalunderwriter.com/pandc/hotnews/viewPC.asp?article=1_17_05_15_15901.xml&src=5
(accessed Dec. 28, 2005) [hereinafter National Underwriter Study].
53
National Underwriter Study, supra n. 52.
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look farther than the trend of damage awards in this country. Nearly eight
percent of all individual paid claims now exceed $1 million, which is double
of that figure just five years ago.54 In just a one-year period (between 1999
and 2000) the median jury award increased forty-three percent.55 Further,
median jury awards for medical liability claims grew at seven times the rate
of inflation, while settlement payouts grew at nearly three times the rate of
inflation.56 Even more telling however, is that the proportion of jury awards
topping $1 million increased from thirty-four percent in 1996 to fifty-two
percent in 2000.57 By 2003, the average jury award had increased to about
$3.5 million.58
In addition, medical malpractice cases are extremely costly to
defend, averaging nearly $23,000 per claim.59 In cases going all the way
through a jury trial before a defense verdict, the average expenses still
exceed $85,000.60
As a result,61 hospitals have increased their budgeted amounts for
medical liability coverage by thirty-four percent for 2005.62 The median
increase was twenty percent (roughly $665,000) with several hospitals
having to nearly double the amount they budgeted.63 While the vast
majority of hospitals (seventy-seven percent) reported either no increase or a
minimal increase in the number of medical liability claims made and/or
lawsuits filed, fifty-nine percent reported that the average amount paid out

_______________________________________________________
54

Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice ‘Crisis’: Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort
Reforms, Health Affairs (Jan. 21, 2004) (available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w4.20v1/DC1 (accessed Dec. 28, 2005)).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Am. Med. Assn., AMA Statement to the Senate HELP Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Re: Patient Access Crisis: The Role of Medical Litigation,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/12990.html (last updated Sept. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Senate
HELP Committee Statement].
59
Anderson, supra n. 52, at 345.
60
Id. at 346.
61
Critics of tort reform say that malpractice costs make up just a fraction of the cause of the dramatic
increases in malpractice insurance premiums. See Symposium, The Current Medical Liability Insurance
Crisis: An Overview of the Problem, Its Catalysts and Solutions, 13 Ann. Health L. 505 (2004).
However, according to Larry Smarr, President of the Physician Insurers Association of America
(“PIAA”), investment losses accounted for, at most, sixteen percent of premium increases in recent years
(“We don’t deny that there are multiple reasons why [malpractice premium] rates are going up, [b]ut it’s
‘mainly due to the increase in the value of claims.’”). Lisa Girion, Malpractice Payouts Have Not
Soared, Reports Say; The two studies suggest awards have little to do with skyrocketing liability
insurance rates, L.A. Times C1 (June 1, 2005). Further, according to Brown Brothers Harriman,
approximately eighty-five percent of the assets of medical liability insurers are invested in bonds
including virtually risk-free treasuries, not stocks. Michael J. Kelly, The True Cause of Escalating
Liability Premiums, Pierce County Med. Bull. (Oct. 2004) (available at
http://www.pcmswa.org/pp_oct1.htm (accessed Dec. 28, 2005)).
62
Maryland Hosp. Assn., 2004 MHA Medical Liability Insurance Survey Results, 1 (2004) [hereinafter
MHA Report].
63
Id.
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over the last five year period has increased significantly.64 It appears that
the main source of the problem is an increase in the amount paid per claim,
rather than an increase in the number of claims.65
D.

Patients, Physicians and Safety Become Victims

The two most controversial issues at the forefront of the tort reform
controversy are patient safety and medical malpractice insurance premiums.
The Plaintiffs’ bar continues to characterize its efforts to preserve its thirtyforty percent contingent income as self-proclaimed guardians of patient
safety. As defense attorneys, we can say without hesitation that every
physician, health care provider and hospital administrator whom we have
ever represented held patient safety out as their over-riding goal. As has
been discussed, the tort system can actually decrease, rather than increase,
patient safety efforts.
Patient safety requires an adequate physician supply.
Yet,
skyrocketing medical liability premiums force physicians in states without
reforms to limit services, retire early, or move to states with reforms.66
These costs of the medical liability crisis have as dramatic consequences,
not only the significant direct effects on physicians, but also the indirect
deleterious effects on patients and the health care system as a whole.67
However, there is a natural deep-seated tension between the
malpractice system and the goals and initiatives of the so-called “patientsafety movement,” i.e., the Plaintiffs’ bar.68 But contrary to the assertions of
the Plaintiffs’ bar that the tort system works to compensate injured patients
and deter medical error, in reality medical liability claims undermine health
care quality by taking a toll on physicians, discouraging the reporting of
medical errors, and limiting medical practice and driving doctors out of
regions.69
1.

Personal Toll on Physicians

As would be experienced by any but the most calloused of persons,

_______________________________________________________
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Id. at 2; see also Greater N.Y. Hosp. Assn., Medical Malpractice Insurance Costs and Coverage, 2,
(Jan. 2005) ("According to the [National Association of Insurance Commissioners], based on 2002 data,
New York’s insurers have the fourth worst loss experience of any state in the country, paying out an
average of $1.44 in claims and expenses for every $1 collected in premiums. . . . If carriers increased
their premiums to achieve better financial performance, however, it would only worsen the malpractice
crisis by making coverage more unaffordable.”).
65
MHA Report, supra n. 62, at 2.
66
Palmisano, supra n. 34, at 373.
67
Id.
68
Studdert, et al., supra n. 2, at 290.
69
See Donald J. Palmisano, AMA Testimony re: Reducing the Excessive Burden the Liability System
Places on the Healthcare Delivery System, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/12991.html (last
updated Sept. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Palmisano Judiciary Committee Testimony]; see also Studdert, et
al., supra n. 2, at 287.
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a physician, who by very definition has dedicated his/her life to the healing
arts, suffers emotionally when served with a summons accusing him/her of
causing injury or death to another person. Physicians who have been sued
report consistent occurrences of severely depressed moods, inner tension,
anger, and frustration.70 Furthermore, the availability of health care is
diminished because “dissatisfied physicians are also more likely to leave
clinical practice or relocate, disrupting continuity of care and jeopardizing
access to services in under served regions.”71
Beyond the purely personal effects of such a reaction, such
responses in the form of physicians’ perceptions matter to the rest of us for
two reasons: 1) “perceptions influence behavior with respect to practice
environment and clinical decision making[;]” and 2) “perceptions influence
the physician-patient relationship and the interpersonal quality of care.”72 In
fact, patients of physicians with higher levels of job satisfaction are
benefited, in that studies have shown that patients of such doctors exhibit
superior adherence to medical treatment.73
A survey of medical specialists in Pennsylvania, found that ninetyone percent of such physicians reported that the malpractice system and its
effects limit doctors’ ability to provide the highest quality medical care.74
Fully three-quarters of the specialists surveyed agreed with the statement,
“[b]ecause of concerns about malpractice liability, I view every patient as a
potential malpractice lawsuit.”75 One surveyed physician stated, “[w]hen
you are constantly looking over your shoulder and thinking that any lessthan-perfect outcome is going to result in a lawsuit, it’s not exactly the best
psychological environment to try to concentrate on what you are doing with
the patient.”76 Likewise, an obstetrician-gynecologist in Garden City, New
York said, “[e]very time I walk into an operating room, I put my family’s
life savings on the line.”77 Similarly, after twenty-five years of practice,
obstetrician Dr. Michael Horn, stopped delivering babies in 2002: “It’s just
the potential, the not knowing if someone will seek an outlandish reward. I

_______________________________________________________
70
Sara C. Charles, M.D. et al., Sued and Nonsued Physicians’ Self-Reported Reactions to Malpractice
Litigation, 142 Am. J. Psych. 437 (Apr. 1985) (355 physicians surveyed from the Chicago Medical
Society).
71
Michelle M. Mello et al., Caring for Patients in a Malpractice Crisis: Physician Satisfaction and
Quality of Care, Health Affairs 43 (July 2004-Aug. 2004).
72
Id. at 42.
73
Id. at 43.
74
Id. at 49.
75
Id. at 48-49.
76
Id. at 49.
77
Donald J. Palmisano, Statement of the AMA to the Committee on Small Businesses: U.S. House of
Representatives re: Medical Liability Reform: Stopping the Skyrocketing Price of Healthcare, 8 (Feb. 17,
2005) (available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/399/mlr_testimony_021505.pdf
(accessed Jan. 11, 2006)) (quoting Dr. John Cafaro—some doctors are paying $130,000 for only $1
Million worth of protection, “[b]ut we are getting sued for $85 and $90 million at a time,” he said, “You
do the math.”) [hereinafter Palmisano Small Business Testimony].
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don’t want to expose myself or my family.”78
The threat of liability exposure affects not only the current status of
medicine but impacts the future of American health care. Eighty-five
percent of specialists practicing in Pennsylvania reported that they were not
very likely or not at all likely to recommend someone graduating from
medical school to practice in Pennsylvania.79 In fact, almost half of
America's medical students indicate that the liability crisis was a factor in
their choice of specialty.80 Dr. William Herd, chairman of Obstetrics and
Gynecology at Wright State University School of Medicine, claims that the
liability crisis already is driving young doctors out of the Dayton area: “In
the last two years, not a single one of our [OB-GYN] residents has set up a
practice in Dayton, or even Ohio.”81
2.

Deterrence of Reporting Medical Errors

Public policy as well as good medical practice has always required
that health professionals and organizations should be encouraged to report
and evaluate health care errors and to share their experiences with others in
order to prevent similar occurrences.82 Nevertheless, a 2002 Harris
Interactive Study (The Fear of Litigation Study—The Impact on Medicine)83
concluded that a majority of physicians believe that the fear of liability
discourages open discussion and the creation of systems to reduce health
care errors.84 Rather, anxiety about exposure to malpractice litigation
overshadows interest in patient safety activities, both in underreporting to
adverse-event reporting systems and lack of communication with patients
about errors.85 The failure to take corrective action and failure to discuss
openly the consequences of medical errors distort public policy, delay
change, and lead to thousands of patient injuries and deaths.86 “Thus, in
spite of the mission of malpractice law to improve the quality of care
through deterrence . . . the fear of litigation obstructs progress in ensuring
patient safety.”87
3.

Limitation of Access to Medical Practices

_______________________________________________________
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Senate HELP Committee Statement, supra n. 58 (citing Burlington County Times, Oct. 2, 2002).
Mello et al., supra n. 71, at 46.
80
America’s Liability Crisis, supra n. 17 (citing AMA Division of Market Research and Analysis, Nov.
2003).
81
Palmisano Small Business Testimony, supra n. 77, at 9 (citing Dayton Daily News, August 28, 2002).
82
Liang & Ren, supra n. 32, at 515-516; Palmisano, supra n. 34. at 375.
83
Harris Interactive, Inc., Common Good: The Fear of Litigation Study - The Impact on Medicine
(available at http://cgood.org/assets/attachments/68.pdf (accessed Feb. 2, 2006)).
84
Palmisano Judiciary Committee Testimony, supra n. 69, at 2.
85
Studdert et al., supra n. 2, at 287.
86
Michael L. Millenson, The Silence; Medicine’s continued quiet refusal to take quality improvement
actions has undermined the moral foundations of medical professionalism, Health Affairs (Mar.–Apr.
2003).
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Studdert, et al., supra n. 2, at 287.
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Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the malpractice liability
crisis is the effect on physician supply. Twenty states are in a “medical
liability crisis,” characterized by a loss of access to health care due to the
pressures of medical malpractice because, in these states, lawsuit costs as
well as settlement and jury awards have caused physician’s insurance
premiums to skyrocket.88 “As a result, patients lose access to care when
physicians are forced to restrict their practice, such as [declining to]
deliver[] babies or perform high-risk surgeries.”89
The American Medical Association estimates that approximately
three-quarters of practice-based physicians work in the small practice setting
which includes thirty-three percent in solo practice and twenty-six percent in
practices with between two and four physicians.90 As with any small
business, such physician practices do not have the economic resources
necessary to absorb or shift the costs of rapidly astronomically increasing
insurance premiums.91
Rather, when overhead expenses increase,
physicians must either increase fees (which is increasingly difficult because
of Medicare, Medicaid, or managed health care plans) or cut other expenses
just to sustain their practices.92 When physicians are forced to trim
expenses, their limited options force difficult choices, such as cutting staff,
limiting staff benefits, or foregoing the purchase of advanced medical
equipment.93 In some cases, in order to find or even obtain medical liability
insurance, physicians must limit certain aspects of their practice.94
The concept of the doctor as the “lawsuit target” is confirmed by the
staggering fact that there are currently more than 125,000 lawsuits against
physicians actively on file (more than twice the number of medical students
currently enrolled in American medical schools), while fifty percent of
neurosurgeons [and almost twenty-five percent of the nation’s ER
physicians] are sued every year.95 The high-risk physicians in states lacking
legal reforms pay “annual malpractice insurance premiums in excess of
$100,000 and in some cases in excess of $200,000 per year, per doctor.”96
One can only imagine the dollars needed to be generated to pay such
staggering premiums.
Yet, as stated above, the most dramatic consequences are felt by the
very patients the malpractice system was purportedly designed to protect.
For example, almost half of American hospitals report that the medical

_______________________________________________________
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America’s Liability Crisis, supra n. 17.
Id.
90
Palmisano Small Business Testimony, supra n. 77, at 8.
91
Id. at 2.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
America’s Liability Crisis, supra n. 17 (citing Archives of Internal Medicine, June 14, 2004).
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Anderson, supra n. 52, at 345.
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liability crisis has resulted in the loss of physicians and/or reduced coverage
in emergency departments.97 The dramatic increase in medical malpractice
costs is shown by the fact that Ty Cobb Health System CEO, Chuck Adams,
earmarked enough money for a 100 percent increase in the annual medical
malpractice premium, only to receive the bill increasing his deductible
tenfold, and booming the premium from $552,000 to $3.15 million, a 469
percent increase.98 Such a change, and the expense it incurred, prevented
improvements such as a renovation of an emergency room in this health care
system.99
As a result of increased medical malpractice costs, curtailment of
medical care is widespread. A Maryland Hospital Association survey
reported that “[i]f hospitals did not have the expense of additional medical
liability coverage, 9 out of 10 hospitals report that they would have spent
that money to upgrade technology, buy new equipment, and modernize their
patient care facilities.”100 In addition, “[o]ver 8 out of 10 hospitals surveyed
would have spent the money they diverted to medical liability coverage for
improving patient safety and addressing workforce issues.”101
Some trauma centers have even had to downgrade the care they
provide or even close their facility.102 For example when two Joliet, Illinois
neurosurgeons stopped practicing brain surgery in February, 2003, the city's
only two hospitals were left without full time coverage for head trauma
cases.103 The two hospitals report that because they are now unable to
handle all emergency head trauma cases, they have to stabilize and transport
serious cases forty-five minutes to the nearest trauma center.104 Similar
recent data from the Boston area show that only twenty-three neurosurgeons
based outside of metro Boston serve thirty-nine hospitals and that the time
frame necessary to recruit a neurosurgeon increased from twenty-three
months in 2002 to thirty months in 2004.105
Fully eighty-two percent of Americans believe that doctors are
being forced to leave their practices because excessive litigation puts the

_______________________________________________________
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Am. Med. Assn., Medical Liability Reform—NOW!, 3 (Jun. 14, 2004) (citing American Hospital
Association 2003 survey) (available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/450/mlrnowjune112004.pdf (accessed Jan. 11, 2006)).
98
Senate HELP Committee Statement, supra n. 58, at 5 (citing Atlanta Journal Constitution, Aug. 11,
2002).
99
Id.
100
MHA Report, supra n. 62, at 3.
101
Id.
102
America’s Liability Crisis, supra n. 17 (citing Archives of Internal Medicine, June 14, 2004, American
College of Emergency Physicians, February 2005); see also BNA, supra n. 37 (citing malpractice
liability and increases in malpractice premiums as some of several reasons for the problem).
103
Senate HELP Committee Statement, supra n. 58, at 5 (citing Chicago Tribune, Feb. 16, 2003).
104
Id.
105
Palmisano Small Business Testimony, supra n.77, at 2.
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costs of liability insurance out of reach.106 One such physician, Dr. Rebecca
Glaser, a popular breast cancer specialist, retired from surgery on April 1,
2004 because of high liability premiums.107 “‘I think it’s horrifying when
we lose a physician who has literally a one-of-a-kind practice,’ said Donna
Buchheit, one of Glaser’s breast cancer patients. . . . ‘It is literally a life and
death issue. The legislature needs to understand that. It is not melodramatic
to say that there will be women who die this year because of this. I certainly
hope I won’t become one of them.’”108
III.

A SOLUTION: FEDERAL TORT REFORM IS ESSENTIAL
FOR ADEQUATE PATIENT SAFETY

A.

The History of the American Medical Malpractice Tort
Reform Movement

Medical liability tort reform did not come to the American legal
forefront until the 1970s. Before that time, medical malpractice claims were
not a significant part of the tort litigation system.109 During the 1970s and
1980s, the United States experienced separate medical malpractice insurance
crises that resulted in sharply increased premiums and even non-availability
of malpractice insurance, due in part to the withdrawal of insurance
companies from the business of medical malpractice coverage.110 While
Plaintiffs’ attorneys blamed insurance financial mismanagement as the sole
cause of these crises, the Government Accounting Office (“GAO”)
concluded that losses on medical malpractice claims were, and continue to
be, the primary driver of medical malpractice premium rate increases.111 In
response, state legislatures enacted tort reform laws to address fears that the
number of medical malpractice claims would leave patients without
necessary medical services.112 Physicians also attempted to stem the tide of
the crisis by creating “physician-sponsored malpractice insurers.”113
In 1975, a mountain of malpractice litigation in California sent
insurance premiums to record levels, causing most insurers in the state to
determine that medicine was not an insurable risk and to refuse coverage to

_______________________________________________________
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America’s Medical Liability Crisis, supra n. 17 (citing Wirthlin World Wide, 2004).
Palmisano Small Business Testimony, supra n 77, at 11 (citing Dayton Daily News, Feb. 28, 2004).
Id. at 9.
109
Melissa Patterson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Product of Insurance Companies and a
Threat to Women's Health, 8 Quinnipiac Health L.J. 109, 112 (2004).
110
Id. at 113.
111
U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., Medical Malpractice Insurance: Multiple Factors Have Contributed to
Increased Premiuim Rates, GOA Highlights, www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-702 (accessed Jan.
11, 2006)
112
Id.; See also Christopher Stidvent, Tort Reform in Alaska: Much Ado About Nothing?, 16 Alaska L.
Rev. 61, 67 (1999) (“In the 1970s, legislatures identified public worries that increasing medical
malpractice claims were raising physician insurance costs to the point that such costs would lead to a
decrease in the availability of essential medical services.”).
113
Patterson, supra n. 109, at 113.
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health care providers.114 California doctors went on strike and took their
case to Sacramento.115 The state legislature responded with the Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act (“MICRA”) and never looked back.116
Between 1976 and 2002, malpractice premiums in California rose 235
percent, while premiums in the rest of the country rose more than 750
percent.117 Before the MICRA was adopted, California’s percentage of loss
payments was significantly higher than its proportion of physicians as
compared to the rest of the country.118 Since then, medical malpractice costs
have fallen substantially as a percentage of the U.S. total, while physician
residency in the state has held steady at approximately fifteen percent of the
U.S. total.119
Under California’s MICRA law, noneconomic damages are capped
at $250,000 (while actual damages remain unchecked), defendants can
introduce evidence of collateral sources of compensation for injury, the
statute of limitations period to bring a claim is shortened, and damage
payments may be periodic, allowing awards to be paid over the time frame
they are intended to cover.120 Additionally, MICRA contains attorney’s
contingency fees with a sliding scale. For example, a California patientplaintiff keeps $778,333 of a $1 million jury award under MICRA; but, in
states without contingency fee reforms, that same patient’s portion of the
same $1 million judgment amount would only be $600,000 because the
personal injury lawyer typically takes a forty percent contingent fee.121
Thus, not only does MICRA’s contingency fee provision directly benefit the
injured patient, it also makes it more difficult for attorneys to finance large
numbers of non-meritorious cases with the few that they win.122
MICRA’s features not only aim to control malpractice litigation, but
they also limit jury awards and keep insurance rates in check. According to
the Insurance Information Institute, awards greater than $1 million are three
times more frequent in New York than in California123—a state almost twice
as large as New York.124 Additionally, despite Los Angeles’ high cost of
living, its malpractice insurance premiums are less than half of the rates in
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Anderson, supra n. 52, at 350.
Id.
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Id.; see also Cal. Med. Assn., MICRA's Basic Provisions, http://www.calphys.org/html/bb112.asp
(accessed Oct. 14, 2005).
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Palmisano, supra n. 34, at 379.
118
American Academy of Actuaries, Issue Brief: Medical Malpractice Tort Reform: Lessons From The
States, 3-4, http://www.actuary.org/pdf/health/medmalp.pdf (accessed Nov. 29, 2005).
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Anderson, supra n. 52, at 350; Liang & Ren, supra n. 32, at 505.
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America’s Liability Crisis, supra n. 17 (citing Physician Insurers Association of American, 2004).
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Anderson, supra n. 52, at 350-351.
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Palmisano Small Business Testimony, supra n. 77, at 8 (citing Poughkeepsie Journal, Apr. 1, 2003).
124
U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html, and
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36000.html (Oct. 17, 2005).
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Cleveland, Ohio and as low as one-sixth of the rates in Miami, Florida.125
The California experience indicates that properly implemented medical
malpractice tort reform can reduce the cost of medical malpractice
insurance.126
While medical malpractice insurance was more readily available in
the 1980s, the cost of premiums for physicians became an epic and
widespread problem.127 In 1986, state legislatures, following California’s
lead, began enacting legislation that capped the noneconomic and punitive
damages a jury could award tort victims in medical liability cases.128 Caps
varied in range, from $250,000 to $875,000.129 By 2004, medical
malpractice premiums were 17.1 percent lower in those states that capped
court awards.130
Proponents of tort reform often asserted that damages were “out of
control,” pointing to large jury verdicts in support of their position.131
Opponents of tort reform, on the other hand, persistently attacked the
constitutionality of the measures.132 Opponents argued, in some cases
successfully, that caps represented “a violation of a [plaintiff’s] equal
protection guarantees, in that they discriminated against tort victims whose
damages exceeded the amount they could recover.”133 In the following
years, some state courts struck down these caps as unconstitutional, marking
a defeat for tort reform advocates.134 Nonetheless, proponents of reform
were able to introduce medical liability reform ideology into the
mainstream, thus paving the way for modern tort reform legislation.135
B.

The Ohio Medical Malpractice Reform Experience

Ohio is an example of the roller-coaster ride experienced by
citizens, through their legislators, attempting to bring some sanity to the
medical malpractice arena. Specifically, the current landscape of tort reform
legislation in Ohio has been shaped by the legislature’s attempts to establish
noneconomic damages caps over the last 30 years. In 1975, the Ohio
legislature enacted a $200,000 limit on noneconomic damages except for

_______________________________________________________
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Palmisano, supra n. 34, at 378 (citing the Medical Liability Monitor, an independent Chicago-based
publication which provides comprehensive rate reports for all 50 states).
American Academy of Actuaries, supra n. 118, at 4.
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Patterson, supra n. 109, at 113.
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Stidvent, supra n. 112, at 70.
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Id “New Hampshire set the highest cap, at $875,000, while Colorado established the lowest at
$250,000 ‘unless clear and convincing evidence indicates greater damages warranted.’” Id. at 70 n. 38.
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Medical Malpractice: Analysis Shows Premiums Lower in States with Caps on Damage Awards.,
Hosp. L. Wkly. (Feb. 12, 2005).
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Id.
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Stidvent, supra n. 112, at 70. Note that these jury verdicts often included large punitive damages.
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wrongful death.136 Sixteen years after the law's enactment in 1991, the Ohio
Supreme Court determined that such a cap violated due process and found
the law unconstitutional.137 The Ohio legislature attempted to reinstate the
cap in 1997,138 but that law was short-lived as the Ohio Supreme Court
struck it down again only two years later.139
The recent revival of a noneconomic damages cap occurred after the
passage of Ohio’s comprehensive medical liability reform bill, Senate Bill
281, which took effect on April 11, 2003.140 The law limits the
compensatory damages for noneconomic loss that may be awarded in
medical, dental, optometric, and chiropractic claims.141 Generally, an
aggrieved plaintiff may be awarded “the greater of [$250,000] or an amount
equal to three times the plaintiff’s economic loss . . . to a maximum of
[$350,000] for each plaintiff or a maximum of [$500,000] for each
occurrence.”142 If the noneconomic losses are for permanent and substantial
physical deformity etc., then $500,000 may be awarded for each plaintiff or
$1 million for each occurrence.143 In addition to providing a ceiling on
noneconomic damages in medical liability claims, the reform law also

_______________________________________________________
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1975 Ohio Laws 2809, 2813 (codified at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.43 (Act effective July 1, 1976,
repealed 1997, 2001)).
137
Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 770-71 (Ohio 1991) (holding that $200,000 cap violated due
process clause of Ohio Constitution).
138
1995-96 Ohio Laws 3867, 3978-80 (codified at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2323.54 (Act effective Jan. 27,
1997, repealed 2001)).
139
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1095 (Ohio 1999).
140
Catherine M. Sharkey, Article: Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 391, 499 (2005). Note that Senate Bill 281 has been codified into multiple laws. See
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2323.41-43, 55 (West 2004) (collateral benefits, good faith motions, limits on
noneconomic damages, and future damages and period payments); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.113
(West 2004 & Supp. 2005) (statute or limitations and repose); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.23 (West
2004) (arbitration agreements); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2743.43 (West 2004) (expert testimony).
141
Final Bill Analysis “Act Summary” quoting Act of Dec. 10, 2002, No. S-281, 2003 Ohio Legis. Serv.
L-3250, L-3265-67 (Banks-Baldwin) (codified at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2323.43 (West 2004)).
142
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2323.43(A).
In a civil action upon a medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim to recover damages
for injury, death, or loss to person or property, all of the following apply: (1) There shall not
be any limitation on compensatory damages that represent the economic loss of the person
who is awarded the damages in the civil action; (2) Except as otherwise provided in division
(A)(3) of this section, the amount of compensatory damages that represents damages for
noneconomic loss that is recoverable in a civil action under this section to recover damages
for injury, death, or loss to person or property shall not exceed the greater of two hundred fifty
thousand dollars or an amount that is equal to three times the plaintiff's economic loss, as
determined by the trier of fact, to a maximum of three hundred fifty thousand dollars for each
plaintiff or a maximum of five hundred thousand dollars for each occurrence. Id.
143
Id. at § 2323.43(A)(3).
The amount recoverable for noneconomic loss in a civil action under this section may exceed
the amount described in division (A)(2) of this section but shall not exceed five hundred
thousand dollars for each plaintiff or one million dollars for each occurrence if the
noneconomic losses of the plaintiff are for either of the following: (a) Permanent and
substantial physical deformity, loss of use of a limb, or loss of a bodily organ system; (b)
Permanent physical functional injury that permanently prevents the injured person from being
able to independently care for self and perform life sustaining activities. Id.
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protects against frivolous lawsuits through attorney sanction144 and permits
physician defendants to introduce evidence of the plaintiff’s receipt of
collateral benefits, with some exceptions.145
Ohio’s comprehensive medical liability reform bill maintained the
applicable statute of limitations for medical liability claims at one year.146
Additionally, the legislation includes a statute of repose providing that an
action may not be brought more than four years after the occurrence of the
act or omission constituting the alleged basis of the claim with certain
exceptions.147 The new law expands the definition of a medical claim to

_______________________________________________________
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Id. at § 2323.42(C).
If the court determines that there was no reasonable good faith basis upon which the plaintiff
asserted the claim in question against the moving defendant or that, at some point during the
litigation, the plaintiff lacked a good faith basis for continuing to assert that claim, the court
shall award all of the following in favor of the moving defendant: (1) All court costs incurred
by the moving defendant; (2) Reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by the moving defendant in
defense of the claim after the time that the court determines that no reasonable good faith
basis existed upon which to assert or continue to assert the claim; (3) Reasonable attorneys’
fees incurred in support of the good faith motion. Id.
145
Id. at § 2323.41(A).
In any civil action upon a medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim, the defendant
may introduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the
damages that result from an injury, death, or loss to person or property that is the subject of
the claim, except if the source of collateral benefits has a mandatory self-effectuating federal
right of subrogation, a contractual right of subrogation, or a statutory right of subrogation. Id.
146
Id. at § 2305.113(A).
Except as otherwise provided in this section, an action upon a medical, dental, optometric, or
chiropractic claim shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. Id.
(1) If prior to the expiration of the one-year period specified in division (A) of this section, a
claimant who allegedly possesses a medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim gives to
the person who is the subject of that claim written notice that the claimant is considering
bringing an action upon that claim, that action may be commenced against the person notified
at any time within one hundred eighty days after the notice is so given. Id. at § 2305.113(B).
147
Id. at § 2305.113(C).
Except as to persons within the age of minority or of unsound mind as provided by section
2305.16 of the Revised Code, and except as provided in division (D) of this section, both of
the following apply: (1) No action upon a medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim
shall be commenced more than four years after the occurrence of the act or omission
constituting the alleged basis of the medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim; (2) If
an action upon a medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim is not commenced within
four years after the occurrence of the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of the
medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim, then, any action upon that claim is barred.
Id.
(1) If a person making a medical claim, dental claim, optometric claim, or chiropractic claim,
in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, could not have discovered the injury resulting
from the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of the claim within three years after the
occurrence of the act or omission, but, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence,
discovers the injury resulting from that act or omission before the expiration of the four-year
period specified in division (C)(1) of this section, the person may commence an action upon
the claim not later than one year after the person discovers the injury resulting from that act or
omission. (2) If the alleged basis of a medical claim, dental claim, optometric claim, or
chiropractic claim is the occurrence of an act or omission that involves a foreign object that is
left in the body of the person making the claim, the person may commence an action upon the
claim not later than one year after the person discovered the foreign object or not later than
one year after the person, with reasonable care and diligence, should have discovered the
foreign object. (3) A person who commences an action upon a medical claim, dental claim,
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include claims against advanced practice nurses and emergency medical
technicians—basic, intermediate, and paramedic, and home or residential
facilities.148 Further, the new law contains provisions on future damages and
period payment provisions,149 arbitration agreements,150 expert testimony,151
annual reports,152 the creation of the Ohio Medical Malpractice
Commission,153 and a study of the feasibility of the Patient Compensation
Fund.154
Ohio’s comprehensive medical liability reform bill has brought
stability in the liability insurance market.155 Prior to passage, premiums had
been increasing at a rate in the thirty percent range. In 2005, they are
increasing between ten to twenty percent.156 Further, premiums increased at
a lower rate in 2004 than they did in the two years prior.157 This prompted
some insurance companies to even lower rates for general practice
physicians in certain regions of the state.158 The CEO's of the five insurance
companies writing seventy percent of Ohio’s medical malpractice insurance
optometric claim, or chiropractic claim under the circumstances described in division (D)(1)
or (2) of this section has the affirmative burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the person, with reasonable care and diligence, could not have discovered the injury
resulting from the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of the claim within the threeyear period described in division (D)(1) of this section or within the one-year period described
in division (D)(2) of this section, whichever is applicable. Id. at § 2305.113(D).
148
Id. at § 2305.113(E)(3).
“Medical claim” means any claim that is asserted in any civil action against a physician,
podiatrist, hospital, home, or residential facility, against any employee or agent of a physician,
podiatrist, hospital, home, or residential facility, or against a licensed practical nurse,
registered nurse, advanced practice nurse, physical therapist, physician assistant, emergency
medical technician-basic, emergency medical technician-intermediate, or emergency medical
technician-paramedic, and that arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any
person. “Medical claim” includes the following: (a) Derivative claims for relief that arise
from the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person; (b) Claims that arise out of the
medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person and to which either of the following
applies: (i) The claim results from acts or omissions in providing medical care. (ii) The claim
results from the hiring, training, supervision, retention, or termination of caregivers providing
medical diagnosis, care, or treatment. (c) Claims that arise out of the medical diagnosis, care,
or treatment of any person and that are brought under section 3721.17 of the Revised Code.
Id.
149
Id. at § 2323.55.
150
Id. at § 2711.23.
151
Id. at § 2743.43.
152
Id. at § 2303.23.
153
2003 S.B. 86, § 3 (Oh. 7/12/2004) (Uncodified Law) (A nine-member Medical Malpractice
Commission is created to study the effects of the bill and to investigate medical malpractice problems
generally.).
154
2002 S.B. 281, § 5 (Oh. 4/11/2003) (Uncodified Law) (The Fund would compensate plaintiffs for
their noneconomic loss.).
155
Michael Norbut, Three Crisis States Show Improvement Since Tort Reform, Am. Med. News (March
28, 2005) (available at http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2005/03/28/prl10328.htm (accessed October
12, 2005)).
156
Id. (quoting Tim Maglione, senior director of government relations for the Ohio State Medical
Association).
157
Id. (quoting Ann Womer Benjamin, Ohio Department of Insurance Director).
158
Id.
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told the Ohio Medical Malpractice Commission that insurers are now less
wary of insuring physicians in the state since pain and suffering limitations
have been put into effect.159 Ohio insurers remain cautious about the Ohio
market, however, until constitutional challenges to the reform legislation are
fully and finally litigated.160
The momentum generated by the reform law as well as the
provisions in the Act itself have also allowed the Ohio Medical Association
to build its case against frivolous lawsuits by seeking sanctions against
attorneys who purposefully clog the state’s justice system.161 “‘Frivolous
conduct’ is defined as conduct of a party to a civil action that ‘. . . serves
merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action . . .’
or conduct ‘. . . not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by
a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law.’”162 Citing to this statutory authority, Ohio courts are now sanctioning
plaintiffs and attorneys for filing frivolous lawsuits against local physicians.
In 2005, a judge ruled in favor of a physician who was the target of
a frivolous lawsuit and ordered the plaintiff's attorney to pay defense
costs.163 In that case, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion for
sanctions on January 18, 2005.164 The appellee, Dr. Zev Maycon, a Cantonarea physician, asserted damages of $6,000, representing the amount of time
he spent preparing for and attending the deposition and his preparation for
trial.165 In a judgment entry dated January 24, 2005, the trial court granted
the motion for sanctions and ordered the plaintiff’s attorney to pay
$6,000.166 The sanctions against the plaintiff’s attorney were upheld by the
Court of Appeals of Ohio in an unpublished opinion decided September 26,
2005.167
C.

Will The Ohio Medical Tort Legislation Stand? Federal
Legislation Is Required

Although current reforms provided by recent Ohio legislation have
benefited Ohio citizens by providing stability in the medical sphere,
constitutional attacks by Plaintiffs’ attorneys are squarely underway and

_______________________________________________________
159

Insurers: Ohio market Stabilizing But More Work Needed, Health & Med. Week 627 (May 10, 2004).
Id.
Norbut, supra n. 155 (quoting Ann Womer Benjamin, Ohio Department of Insurance Director).
162
Barbato v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 4725, at * 12 (Ohio App. 5th Dist. Sept. 26,
2005) (citing R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) and (ii)).
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. “‘Catherine Cicchini Little, counsel for the Plaintiffs, Benjamin and Kelly Barbato, committed
frivolous conduct under R.C. § 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(ii), in that her conduct, i.e. her continuing assertion of a
claim of malpractice against Defendant Maycon was not warranted under existing law and could not be
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;’ Judgment
Entry, Jan. 24, 2005, at 1-2.” Id. at *11.
167
Id. at *20.
160
161
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have been successful in the past. An additional problem among the several
states is that some states have been unable to enact tort reform in any form.
The following tables demonstrate the lack of uniformity and, in many cases,
unavailability of tort reform medical malpractice measures.

Published by eCommons, 2005

230

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, Fifty-State Survey168

STATE EFFECTIVE
DATE

NONECONOMIC
CAP

GENERAL
CIVIL CAP

AK

1986

400K

CA

1975

250K

CO

1988

300K / 1M total

FL

2003

500K

GA

2005

350K

HI

1986

375K

ID

1987

250K

IN

1975

KS

1987

LA

1975

500K total

ME

1999

400K

MD

1986

MA

1986

500K

MI

1986

280K

MS

2002

500K

MO

1986

350K

MT

1995

250K

NE

1976

1.75M total

1.25M total
250K

500K

_______________________________________________________
168

Catherine M. Sharkey, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 391, Appendix I (2005).
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NV

2002

350K

NM

1992

600K total

ND

1995

OH

2003

250K
or
3x
economic loss up to
350K / 500K per
occurrence

OK

2003

300K

SD

1985

500K

TX

2003

750K

UT

1986

400K

VA

1976

1.5M total

WV

1986

250K

WI

1979

350K

231

500K

State Consideration in 2005169

Review Panels

Changes
or
Implementation
of
Noneconomic Damage
Caps

Connecticut

Alaska

Kansas

Arizona

_______________________________________________________
169

Natl. Conf. of State Legis., State Medical Malpractice Reform 2005 Number at a Glance,
http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/sclaw/medmalataglance.htm.
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Louisiana

Connecticut

Maine

Georgia

Mississippi

Hawaii

Nevada

Illinois

New Hampshire

Indiana

New Jersey

Iowa

North Carolina

Kentucky

Pennsylvania

Maine

South Carolina

Maryland

Tennessee

Massachusetts

Wyoming

Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
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Tennessee
Vermont
Virginia
Washington

The central question in the medical liability tort reform debate is
whether these “patchworks set up by the states make any sense in terms of
driving physicians from state to state who might otherwise stay in one state
if there was a uniform standard across the [U.S.]”170
Under the present legal framework each state determines what
limits, if any, it places on noneconomic damage caps in medical liability
lawsuits. Clearly, national uniformity is untenable under this approach.
Further, this state-by-state patchwork must be evaluated by comparing each
state’s attempt on equal footing. For example, a “hard cap,” like the
$250,000 cap found in California’s MICRA, is not comparable to the “soft
cap” provided in the Missouri law as such a cap increases with inflation.171
Originally set at $350,000 in 1986, the cap on noneconomic damages in
Missouri was $565,000 as of February 1, 2004.172 Other states have enacted
“soft caps” like Missouri,173 but many states such as Alaska,174
Mississippi,175 and Nevada176 have recognized their ineffectiveness, have

_______________________________________________________
170

A.C. Hoffman, Governmental Studies on Medical Malpractice: The Implications of Rising Premiums
for Healthcare and the Allocation of Health Resources, 24 Med. & L. 297, 299 (June 2005) “Medical
malpractice is a bigger problem than most people want to admit.” Id. at 298.
171
Medical Liability Reform—NOW!, supra n. 97, at 23.
172
Id.
173
Florida has a separate cap on noneconomic damages for practitioners ($500,000) and non-practitioners
($750,000). Fla. Stat. § 766.118 (2004). The cap, however, increases to $1 Million for practitioners and
$1.5 Million for non-practitioners if the negligence results in death or a permanent vegetative state or if
the court finds a manifest injustice would occur if the cap was not increased. Medical Liability
Reform—NOW!, supra n. 97, at 24. Also, the $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages in Massachusetts
does not apply if the court finds the patient’s injury resulted in substantial disfigurement or permanent
loss or impairment, or if the court determines that other special circumstances warrant a finding that such
limitation would deprive the plaintiff of just compensation for the injuries sustained. Id.
174
Signed into law by Governor Murkowski on June 7, 2005, Senate Bill 67 strengthens Alaska’s
existing cap on noneconomic damages by establishing a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages
awarded in a personal injury cause of action, and a $400,000 cap on noneconomic damages awarded in a
cause of action involving wrongful death or a severe permanent physical impairment that is more than
seventy percent disabling. Alaska Stat. § 09.55.549(c) & (d) (2005). A single cap applies “regardless of
the number of health care providers against whom the claim is asserted” or the number of causes of
action filed. Id. at § 09.55.549(e).
175
On June 3, 2004, the Mississippi Legislature enacted House Bill 13 a civil justice reform bill that
further strengthens Mississippi’s medical liability reform laws. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-60 (2005). Most
importantly the bill creates a hard $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages for medical liability causes of
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abandoned soft-caps and have enacted legislation to strengthen their existing
caps.177
While studies of various aspects of the liability crisis in states that
have implemented legislative reforms reveal the value of such efforts,178
several states have had reforms overturned by the courts, while others’ state
constitutions prohibit caps on damages.179 This confusing and inconsistent
tort liability scheme that varies from state to state can only drive physicians
from state to state in search of optimal working conditions.180
The answer lies in tort reform on the federal level. Another benefit
in federal tort reform is health care savings in various health care
programs.181 The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) estimates of health
care savings show that federal tort reform makes sense from the government
expenditure perspective.182 The CBO estimates, for example, that direct
spending, not to mention payments for indirect costs, for federal health
insurance programs would be reduced by $14.9 billion over a ten-year
period with federal tort reform.183 In addition to the federal savings, state
and local governments would save about $6 billion over ten years as a result
of lower premiums for health care benefits they provide to their
employees.184 Medicaid costs to states would decrease by $2.5 billion over
that period.185 The benefits are many, but the political opposition is steep to
federal tort reform.
D.

Direct Reforms Improve the Quality of Health Care

Because of the mixed results tort reform efforts have had in
action filed against a health care provider. Id. This provision significantly strengthens Mississippi’s
existing cap, which was enacted into law in 2002, by deleting the exceptions to the cap and increases that
were scheduled to occur in 2011 and 2017. Id.
176
As the result of passage of the Keep Our Doctors in Nevada initiative in 2004, Nevada has a $350,000
cap on noneconomic damages in medical liability cases. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41A.035 (2005).
177
See Medical Liability Reform—NOW!, supra n. 97, at 23-26.
178
Palmisano, supra n. 34, at 377.
179
Id. at 379-80.
180
A.C. Hoffman, supra n. 170, at 299.
181
Cong. Budget Off., Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: Cost Estimate for H.R. 5: The Help
Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003, http://www.cbo.gov/
showdoc.cfm?index=4091& sequence=0&from=6 (accessed Nov. 29, 2005).
182
Proposed federal medical tort reform legislation would “lower the cost of malpractice insurance for
physicians, hospitals, and other health care providers and organizations. That reduction in insurance costs
would, in turn, lead to lower charges for health care services and procedures, and ultimately, to a
decrease in rates for health insurance premiums.” Id. In addition, since “employers would pay less for
health insurance for employees, more of their employees’ compensation would be in the form of taxable
wages and other fringe benefits. As a result, CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 5 would increase federal
revenues by $15 million in 2004 and by $3 billion over the 2004-2013 period.” Id. Further, “[e]nacting
H.R. 5 also would reduce federal direct spending for Medicare, Medicaid, the government’s share of
premiums for annuitants under the Federal Employees Health Benefits (“FEHB”) program, and other
federal health benefits programs. CBO estimates that direct spending would decline by $14.9 billion over
the 2004-2013 period.” Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
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different states, critics have concluded that legislative reform will not solve
the medical liability crisis.186 A closer look at various reform efforts,
however, indicates otherwise. In states such as Florida and Missouri, tort
reform legislation has instituted “soft caps” on damages, which are subject
to a variety of exceptions, can increase annually with inflation or other
economic indicators, or apply individually to every defendant or plaintiff,
thereby allowing several caps for a single claim.187 Further, some states like
New York have enacted reforms in piecemeal fashion and did not include a
cap on damages.188 Consequently, malpractice damage awards have eluded
reductions, and insurance premiums remain overwhelming.
In other states that have instituted direct reforms, damage caps have
contributed to insurance rate reductions, enabling providers to continue to
practice without limitation.189 Direct reforms are statutory limits on
malpractice awards such as caps on total or noneconomic damages,
collateral source rule reforms (which require damages to be reduced by all
or part of the value of collateral sources payments to the plaintiff), abolition
of punitive damages, or abolition of mandatory prejudgment interest.190
Such reforms statistically attract and retain physicians,191 and improve
productivity in health care by reducing the prevalence of defensive medicine
practices through their effect on claim rates and on compensation
conditional on a particular claim.192
Specifically, physician supply rose by two to three percent more in
states that adopted direct liability reforms during a two-year research
study.193 However, reforms have a larger effect on physician supply three or
more years after their adoption; in other words, it takes time for the effects
of tort reform to become apparent.194 The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services “found that between 1970 and 2000 states with malpractice
damage caps have approximately 12% more physicians per capita than
states without such restrictions over the thirty-year period.”195 Moreover,
insurance premiums in states that cap awards are 17.1 percent lower than in

_______________________________________________________
186

See Symposium, supra n. 61; see also Liang & Ren, supra n. 32. at 505.
Palmisano, supra n. 34, at 380.
188
American Academy of Actuaries, supra n. 118, at 3.
189
Liang & Ren, supra n. 32, at 502.
190
Kessler & McClellan, supra n. 12, at 941 (indirect reforms include impositions of mandatory periodic
payments, caps on attorneys’ contingency fees, and abolition of joint-and-several liability for total or
noneconomic damages).
191
Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Does Medical Malpractice Reform Help States Retain
Physicians and Does It Matter? 17 (unpublished, Am. Enter. Inst. September 11, 2003) (available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/200310091_klick.pdf).
192
Kessler & McClellan, supra n. 12, at 952.
193
Kessler et al., supra n. 36, at 2618.
194
Id.
195
Liang & Ren, supra n. 32, at 515.
187
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states that do not cap awards.196 But in no other state has tort reform had a
greater effect on the medical liability crisis than in California; thus MICRA
is the prototype for proposed federal tort reform legislation, designed to
provide a uniform safety net to all American doctors and the citizens they
serve in our fifty states.
E.

Federal Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Legislation

1.

The Constitutional Power of Congress to Enact Tort Reform
Legislation and Federal Authority for Preemption of State
Medical Liability Reform

While federal tort reform legislation is necessary to provide
uniformity to the tort reform arena, some have questioned the power of the
federal government to become involved in tort law, which they claim has
been traditionally relegated to the states. It is true that the federal
government is a government of enumerated powers. Thus, if Congress
wishes to enact legislation on any subject, it must find authority for that
legislation in some provision of the Constitution.197 While Article I, Section
8 enumerates a list of powers, by far the most influential of these is the
power “[t]o regulate [c]ommerce . . . among the several [s]tates.”198 In
1824, Justice Marshall and the Supreme Court explained that commerce
comprises every species of commercial intercourse.199 That broad sweeping
standard of the Commerce Clause only intensified with the Court’s finding
that activity that has a cumulative substantial effect on interstate commerce
can be regulated by the federal government.200
A limitation on Congress’ sweeping legislative authority under the
Commerce Clause came into question in the 1995 case of United States v.
Lopez.201 Congress had passed a statute that made it “a federal offense for
‘any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.’”202 In Lopez,
the Court invalidated the statute as in excess of Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause, holding that the act neither regulated a commercial
activity nor contained a requirement that the possession was connected to
interstate commerce. The Court further held that Congress’ Commerce
Power was valid only when 1) regulating channels of commerce; 2)
regulating the instrumentalities of commerce; and 3) regulating activities

_______________________________________________________
196

Thorpe, supra n. 54, at 1.
Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Tort Reform Unduly Infringe on State Sovereignty?,
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=/dorf/20030430.html (accessed Nov.
29, 2005).
198
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
199
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 68 (1824).
200
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
201
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
202
Id. at 551.
197
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which have a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., substantially
affecting interstate commerce.203
Thereafter, in United States v.
Morrison,204 the Court invalidated a portion of the Violence Against Women
Act by applying Lopez. The Court concluded that the activity regulated by
the Act could not be classified as “economic activity,” and therefore the
cumulative substantial effects test laid out in Wickard was inapplicable.205
With Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court has established the
test to determine whether a regulated activity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. The Court must consider four factors: (1) whether the
regulated activity is commercial or economic in nature; (2) whether an
express jurisdictional element is provided in the statute to limit its reach; (3)
whether Congress made express findings about the effects of the proscribed
activity on interstate commerce; and (4) whether the link between the
prohibited activity and the effect on interstate commerce is attenuated.206
Congressional legislative authority is proper in the federal
regulation of medical liability reform.207 Excessive malpractice litigation
results in increases in malpractice premiums, which in turn force physicians
and patients to cross state lines. Responding to the problem, the United
States Department of Human Health and Services (“HHS”) issued a Service
Report finding that “the litigation crisis . . . has made insurance premiums
unaffordable or even unavailable for many doctors.”208 The excesses of the
current litigation system are a crucial element to “defensive medicine—the
costly use of medical treatments by a doctor for the purpose of avoiding
litigation.”209 Patients, who most need doctors, are at risk of not being able
to find one because the doctor has “given up practice, limited the practice to
patients without health conditions that would increase the litigation risk, or
moved to a state with a fairer legal system where insurance can be obtained
at a lower price.”210 The results have been profound, with patients being
forced to drive hundreds of miles across state lines to receive health care.
The sum total of this activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
thus falling into federal jurisdiction and ultimately justifying federal

_______________________________________________________
203

Id. at 558-59.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
205
Id. at 609-10.
206
Id. at 610-12.
207
The HEALTH Act of 2005, includes specific findings that the current civil justice system adversely
affects patients access to quality health care, that the health care and insurance industries affect interstate
commerce, that the health care liability systems affect commerce by contributing to higher health costs,
as well as having a significant effect on the amount, distribution and use of Federal funds. H.R. 5, 109th
Cong. §2(a) (Jul. 21, 2005).
208
U.S. Dept. of Human Health & Servs., Confronting the New Health Care Crisis: Improving Health
Care Quality and Lowering Costs By Fixing Our Medical Liability System,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.htm (accessed Nov. 29, 2005).
209
Id.
210
Id. (emphasis added).
204
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preemption of state medical liability laws.
Federal authority to legislate on medical liability reform is also
justified by Congress’ Spending Power. The Constitution’s Spending Power
authorizes Congress to “provide for the . . . general welfare of the United
States.”211 The power is utilized by Congress as authority over virtually all
expenditures of federal funds. The Supreme Court in Dole v. South Dakota
held that incident to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds and has repeatedly employed the power “to further
broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative
directives.”212
The Supreme Court in Dole set out four general restrictions on the
Spending Power:
In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended
to serve general public purposes, courts should defer
substantially to the judgment of Congress. Second, we have
required that if Congress desires to condition the States’
receipt of federal funds, it “must do so unambiguously . . . ,
enabling the States to exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”
Third, our cases have suggested (without significant
elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be
illegitimate if they are unrelated “to the federal interest in
particular national projects or programs.” Finally, we have
noted that other constitutional provisions may provide an
independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.213
In the case of medical liability reform laws, it is clear that Congress
has the authority to legislate pursuant to its Spending Power. Federal funds
are consistently expended on health care as the federal government provides
direct care to members of the armed forces, veterans, and patients served by
the Indian Health Service, not to mention the funding of Medicare and
Medicaid. Further, the federal government provides tax breaks to workers
who obtain health insurance through their employers.214 Applying these
facts to the Court’s holding in Dole suggests that the federal government is
justified in attaching strings to the funds it provides for health care since

_______________________________________________________
211

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of
Burger, C.J.)).
213
Id. at 207-08 (citations omitted).
214
It is estimated that the federal government would save at least $25 billion a year in taxpayers' money if
its proposed medical malpractice reforms were put into place. Andrea D. Stailey, The Health Act's Same
Old Story, Different Congress Dilemma: Overhauling the HEALTH Act and Unifying Congress as a
Remedy for Tort Reform, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 187, 201-02 (Fall 2004).
212
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requiring state compliance would be reasonably related to the purpose of the
expenditure itself.
2.

Attempting to Provide Medical Malpractice Tort Reform at
the Federal Level

A brief overview of the attempts to enact federal tort reform
illustrates that passing federal legislation to cap noneconomic damages has
proven to be an arduous task. In 1997 and again in 1999, members of the
House of Representatives introduced initial attempts at health care liability
reform.215 Each of the proposed bills contained provisions that capped
noneconomic damages at $250,000. Although each bill was referred to a
House Committee,216 both died in committee and were never reintroduced in
the House for a vote.
On April 25, 2002, the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost,
Timely Health Care Act of 2002 (“HEALTH Act of 2002”) was introduced
in the House of Representatives in order to improve “accessibility to health
care and the quality of medical care by reducing the burden of medical
liability.”217 The HEALTH Act of 2002, among other things, would
have limited noneconomic damages at $250,000, regardless of the number
of defendants a plaintiff sues and preempted certain state laws.218 Like its
predecessor, the HEALTH Act of 2002 died in committee.
The HEALTH Act of 2003 was proposed in the House on March 21,
2003 and stated the same goals as its predecessor.219 Although it passed in
the House, the Senate failed to act on the bill after two readings. In that
same Congress, Senate Republicans made yet another attempt to pass health
care liability reform by introducing the Patients First Act of 2003. Although
this bill was nearly identical to the HEALTH Act of 2003 in many important
respects,220 Senate Democrats refused to debate the measure.
House Republicans tried again to revive the failed bills by

_______________________________________________________
215
On March 18, 1997, the House introduced the revised Health Care Liability Reform Act of 1997.
H.R. 1091, 105th Cong. (March 8, 1997). On June 16, 1999, the House introduced the Medical
Malpractice Rx Act. H.R. 2242, 106th Cong. (June 16, 1999).
216
The Health Care Liability Reform Act of 1997 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
The Medical Malpractice Rx Act was referred to the subcommittee on Health and Environment.
217
Melissa C. Gregory, Capping Noneconomic Damages in Medical Malpractice Suits is Not the
Panacea of the “Medical Liability Crisis”, 31 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1031, 1040 (2005); R. Bruce Josten,
Letter to the House of Representatives, H.R. 4600, the HEALTH Act of 2002,
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2002/.020925hr4600.htm (accessed September 25, 2005).
218
H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. § 4(c) (Apr. 25, 2002).
219
H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003). Those goals included improving access to health care as well as
improving medical care by reducing the burden the liability system weighs on the health care system.
This bill also had $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages.
220
Both bills would have imposed a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in health care lawsuits. See
Kathryn Zeiler, Turning from Damage Caps to Information Disclosure: An Alternative Tort Reform, 5
Yale J. Health Pol'y, L. & Ethics 385 at fn 1 (Winter 2005), citing to S.B. 11, 108th Cong. (2003).
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proposing the HEALTH Act of 2004 on May 5, 2004.221 In principle, the
Act was identical to the previous HEALTH Acts,222 and the bill successfully
passed through the House.223 History repeated itself yet again, and the bill
died in the Senate without a vote.224
On July 28, 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare Act of 2005
(“HEALTH Act of 2005”) which, among other things, effectively caps
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice litigation to $250,000, limits
attorneys fees, and restricts the circumstances in which plaintiffs may seek
punitive damages.225 Upon introduction in the House, the bill’s sponsor,
Representative Phil Gingrey,226 described the bill's purpose as “to improve
patient access to health care services and provide improved medical care by
reducing the excessive burden the liability system places on the health care
delivery system.”227 The bill preempts state law only to the extent that such
law prevents the application of any provision of the proposed federal law.228
The bill does not preempt state law on any provision not addressed in the
bill, nor does it preempt or supersede any state or federal law that imposes
greater procedural or substantive protections for health care providers from
any loss or damages.229 The bill is expected to face substantial opposition in
the Senate, as the bill’s predecessors have failed to pass muster on the
Senate floor.
In addition to limiting noneconomic damages, and following the
California model, the bill:
•

Limits the liability of manufacturers, distributors and providers
of drugs and medical devices whose products comply with Food
and Drug Administration standards;
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221
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•

Authorizes the award of punitive damages only where there is
clear and convincing evidence that a person acted with
malicious intent to injure the claimant or deliberately failed to
avoid unnecessary injury to the claimant;

•

Allows the court to restrict the payment of attorney contingency
fees by limiting the fees to a decreasing percentage based on the
increasing value of the amount awarded;

•

Allows the introduction of collateral-source benefits, such as
health insurance payouts, and the amount paid for those benefits
as evidence; and

•

Sets a three-year limitations period for bringing suit after the
date of the manifestation of an injury or one year after discovery
of the injury.230

Following the familiar pattern, the measure is awaiting
consideration in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and, to the dismay
of many, the HEALTH Act of 2005 may face the same fate as previous bills
that died before even coming to the floor for debate. Nearly unanimous
Democratic opposition means that the Senatorial votes necessary to pass the
measure are not likely to materialize until 2007 at the earliest.231 Further,
the Plaintiffs’ attorneys group, ATLA, not only actively opposes the
legislation, but it has been raising millions of dollars to combat bill passage
and has hired additional congressional lobbyists to continue to squeeze
lawmakers into opposing these tort reform efforts.232 It is not surprising
then that, despite Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist’s efforts to compromise
and effect a bipartisan solution to the malpractice tort reform crisis by
means of tort reform at the federal level, there has been no momentum to
effect bill passage.233 Special interests rather than public interest seem to
prevail in Washington, D.C. on the tort reform issue.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A recent risk management study concluded that malpractice loss
costs are growing annually at a trend rate of eight percent.234 Hospitals and
physicians can no longer maintain a reasonable level of practice, while
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retaining professional autonomy and financial security. As a result,
physicians are reducing their hours or leaving practice altogether “at the
peak of their diagnostic powers,”235 and thus, diminishing the level of
medicine in many areas of the country.236
In addition to patient safety and quality improvement, the
fear of litigation stifles the advancement of new medical
treatments and medications, encourages physicians to
practice defensive medicine, overwhelms the healthcare
system with paperwork—leaving less time for patient care,
and discourages qualified candidates from pursuing a career
in medicine or from moving to a state with a bad liability
climate.237
Furthermore, the medical liability crisis is expanding beyond patient care
into other areas such as the biomedical industry.238
However, several states have enacted medical liability tort reforms
to combat the deleterious effects on patient care. MICRA continues to
provide health care providers in California with a shield of protection that is
out of reach in many other states. Consequently, the American Academy of
Actuaries recommends a national tort reform package of measures,
including a cap on noneconomic awards and a mandatory collateral offset
rule, in order to achieve savings in malpractice losses and insurance
premiums.239
It is axiomatic that quality of health care improves when there is
greater access to physicians and healthcare services.240 If our goal as a
nation is to promote a “culture of safety,” then it will be necessary to create
a legal environment that encourages professionals and organizations to work
in unison to identify problems in providing care, evaluate the causes, and
use that information to improve care for all patients.241 Without a change in
the process of resolving claims for medical injury, the liability crisis will
continue to kill the golden goose, harming not only our health care
providers, but also our own access to adequate and affordable medical care.
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